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Incentive Benefits and Costs
Timothy J. Bartik
Senior Economist
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
bartik@upjohn.org
October 18, 2018
Presentation at Roundtable on Evaluating Economic Development Tax 
Incentives, sponsored by National Conference of State Legislatures 
Presentation based on 3 of my recent 
papers, particularly 2nd
1. “But For” Percentages for Economic Development 
Incentives: What percentage estimates are plausible based 
on the research literature? (June 2018; Upjohn Working 
Paper 18-289)
2. Who Benefits from Economic Development Incentives? How 
Incentive Effects on Local Incomes and the Income 
Distribution Vary with Different Assumptions about Incentive 
Policy and the Local Economy (March 2018; Upjohn Institute 
Technical Report No. 18-034)
3. What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local 
Economies? (May 2018; Upjohn Institute Technical Report 
18-035)
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Main questions addressed in this  
presentation 
• What should we count as benefits and costs of economic 
development tax incentives? 
• What are main factors affecting these benefits and costs? 
(“Factors” = features of how local economy behaves and/or 
policy parameters)
• What are reasonable assumptions for analysts to make about 
these factors, based on the empirical research literature?
• How do different policy choices affect these benefits and 
costs? 
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Incentive benefits and costs should be 
measured as increases in real after-tax income 
per capita of local residents
• Ideal: local residents’ change in “well-being”, adjusted for amenities, but income per 
capita is practical proxy
• Narrower than increase in gross state product/state personal income, which reflects 
incomes of in-migrants. In-migrants gain little, as could have moved elsewhere with 
similar outcomes. 
• In other words, welfare analysis of STATE policy is quite different from welfare 
analysis of NATIONAL policy because of internal migration.
• Much broader than increase in state tax revenues, in 4 respects: (1) should include 
locals; (2) should subtract out increased needs for public services, due to in-
migration, which is considerable, and usually offsets 90% plus of increased tax 
revenue; (3) should add in increased earnings per capita of state residents due to 
higher employment rates & wages, which will usually be at least 4 times fiscal 
benefits; (4) should also add in increased property values, and effects on locally-
owned businesses. 
• Focusing on fiscal benefits alone is weird because it assumes state and local 
governments are trying to maximize state/local fisc, which is weird goal. 3
Incentive Given 
to Business
Effect on business decisions
Some businesses locate or 
expand that otherwise would 
not have (but for >0%)
Multiplier
Initial jobs create local 
jobs in suppliers, 
retailers, clusters. 
Other economic effects
Boost to labor and 
housing demand 
increases wages and 
property values.
Additional income
…for local residents 
who would 
otherwise not be 
employed.
Revenue
Additional tax 
revenue partly 
offsets the cost of 
the incentive. 
Workers and 
property owners
Higher wages and 
property values 
increase their 
income.
Opportunity cost 
Net incentive costs 
must be paid for. 
Higher taxes or 
spending cuts will 
have negative 
demand or supply-
side effects.
In-state beneficiaries 
Increased profits 
due to incentives for 
local owners.
Unaffected decisions
Some incentives reward 
businesses for what 
they would have done 
anyway, or substitute 
for other job creation 
(but for <  25%).
Displacement
New businesses 
may compete 
with and harm 
existing local 
businesses.
Increased population
Labor demand drives 
migration (70-80%), 
increasing need for  
government services 
(90% of revenue).
Business costs 
increase
Reduces jobs, 
& profits of 
local owners.
Key determinant of incentive benefits and 
costs: “but for” percentage 
• “But for” percentage: percentage of incented jobs that actually 
increased jobs in state, compared to counterfactual of this incentive 
not being provided.  
• 3 reasons this percentage should always be assumed to be less 
than 100%: (1) always some probability that project would have 
gone on at same scale anyway; (2) even if incentive made 
difference, project might have occurred at reduced scale; (3) even if 
this firm would not have done project without incentive, the land and 
labor utilized might have attracted other firms.
• Review of research literature: “but for” is likely less than 25% for 
“average” incentives.
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But-for research literature review
• None of 34 estimates reviewed is based on randomized control trial 
(RCT).
• 23 of 34 are likely positively biased: survey of firms or economic 
developers; comparison of incented firms or areas with non-
incented, which is biased because incentives by design go to 
growing firms or areas.
• 4 of 34 are likely negatively biased: incented firms or areas seem 
likely to be negatively chosen, for example comparison is of future 
growth of more or less incented areas in past. 
• 7 estimates have no obvious bias: mostly comparisons of different 
states’ incentive structures. 
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But-for research literature review
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Figure 1: Median “But For" Percentage
NOTE:  State and local business tax literature: range of 4–21% for average incentive. Model assumes average 
incentive yields 12%. Foxconn (10.7 x average) is 76%. 
Multiplier research literature review
• Typical manufacturing input-output multipliers at state level are between 2 
and 3. Model baseline assumes 2.5. 
• Cost feedbacks reduce by 1/4th to 1/3rd. In model, baseline of 2.5 yields 
effective multiplier of 1.74. 2 to 3 range  yields 1.43 to 2.05. 
• High-tech multipliers may be as high as 6 (Moretti research), which exceeds 
plausible I/O values (effective multiplier after cost feedbacks is 3.91). 
Probably due to “agglomeration economies”: productivity spillovers due to 
size of city or industry cluster, which allows for more specialized suppliers, 
better matching, and knowledge spillovers.
• Locally-owned smaller firms may have multipliers greater by 0.25, due to 
greater local purchases. 
• IMPLAN and other input-output models don’t include cost feedbacks. REMI 
does, but also adds in extra agglomeration multiplier effects. 
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Effects of Emp on Emp/Pop vs. Pop
• Logically, boost to local jobs must either boost local employment 
rate or local population, as E = (E/P) × P.
• Created jobs are directly filled by: (1) Employed locals; (2) Non-
employed locals; (3) Non-locals. 
• But category (1) yields local vacancies, that are filled in same 3 
ways. Vacancy chain only ends when the new job leads to: (2) job 
for non-employed local; (3) job for non-local. 
• Proportion that goes to non-employed local vs. non-local depends in 
part on how incented firm hires. But also depends on how multiplier 
jobs are filled, and how subsequent vacancies are filled. So 
depends on factors such as: (1) local unemployment (higher = more 
effect on E/P), or (2) better local workforce system (more effect on 
E/P). 
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LR Effects of Emp on Pop: surprisingly high or low? (SR effect is 
0.40 on pop, 0.60 on Emp/Pop). Model: assumes 0.85 avg Pop 
effect over 80 years, 0.15 Emp/Pop effect
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Long-run elasticities of local employment to population ratio with respect to once and for all local 
employment shock, U.S. studies
Study Long-run Qualifications Emp/Pop effect Pop effect
Bartik (2015) 10-years At 4.0% unemployment rate (UR) 0.20 0.80
10-years At 7.1% UR 0.34 0.66
10-years At 10% UR 0.47 0.53
Bartik (1991) 8 years OLS 0.23 0.77
8 years 2SLS using demand shock instruments 0.37 0.63
Blanchard and Katz (1992) 8 years 0.07 0.93
17 years 0 1.00
Bartik (1993) 8 years 0.28 0.72
17 years 0.25 0.75
Bound and Holzer (2000) 10 years High-school or less 0.24 0.76
College or more 0.12 0.88
Partridge and Rickman (2006) 10 years Preferred estimates 0.21 0.79
Alternative estimates 0.42 0.58
Notowidigdo (2013) 10 years Mean effect 0.14 0.86
Beaudry, Green and Sand (2014) 10 years 0.24 0.76
Amior and Manning (2018) 10 years 0.30 0.70
Key consequence of persistent modest Emp/Pop effect 
and significant Pop effect is low fiscal benefits relative 
to earnings benefits
• Revenue will tend to go up a little slower than employment, due to 
inelastic state and local taxes such as sales taxes and property 
taxes, and relatively flat income taxes. 
• Spending may go up a bit faster than population, due to 
infrastructure costs. Model: assumes proportionate. 
• Model: spending needs increase 92% as much as revenue. 
• Consequence: persistent earnings effects end up being over 4 times 
net fiscal benefits.  
11
Opportunity costs: some demand-side effects, some supply-side 
effects of higher business taxes, but major possible effects of 
reducing “productive” education spending
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Baseline model (2.5 multiplier; non-local businesses; 15% avg E/P effect; 
net incentive costs financed 50% tax increases, 50% spending cuts, with 
44% of tax increases from business taxes, 22% of spending cuts from K-
12):  relatively modest effects on jobs for local residents. 
Job effects of incentives as percentage of incented jobs
Net effects Sub-categories
But-for direct jobs 11.70
Plus multiplier jobs 28.71
Lost jobs due to higher local costs (e.g., wages, land) (8.34)
Net jobs including multiplier and cost offsets 20.37 
Lost jobs due to D-side impact of paying for incentives (1.84)
Lost jobs due to business tax increases (1.08)
Lost jobs due to K-12 spending cuts (1.00)
Net jobs including all effects 16.45
Net jobs going to local residents 2.49
Baseline model: modest overall benefit-cost ratio of about 1.2
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Benefits and costs as % of incentive costs
Revenue increases 276.2
Spending need increases (253.1)
Net fiscal benefits 23.2
Exported business taxes 12.5
Higher earnings due to higher Emp/Pop 82.9
Higher earnings due to higher wages 19.7
Total higher earnings 102.6
Higher property values 28.8
Lost wages from K-12 cuts (38.1)
Profit effects on local businesses (6.7)
Net total 122.3
Benefit cost ratio (as proportion) 1.223
Multiplier makes big difference (“holding all else constant”: if 
higher multiplier just due to higher value-added per job, given 
dollar incentive will be lower % of costs, lowering “but for”. So 
really should focus on higher cluster multipliers)
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1.22
3.98
0.44
Baseline (multiplier = 2.5) Multiplier of 6 Multiplier of 1.5
How the Multiplier Affects the Benefit-Cost Ratio
Increased local hiring of non-employed increases 
incentive benefit-cost ratio
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1.22
1.62
Baseline local hiring (15%) Higher local hiring (28%)
How Local Hiring Affects Incentive Benefits
Financing incentives by cutting productive services 
has negative net effects – B/C ratio turns negative 
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1.22
(3.43)
BASELINE( 11% FROM ED SPENDING) 100% FROM ED SPENDING
Effects of Financing Incentives Via Reduced Education Spending
Can focus on locally-owned, non-export-base firms 
work? Yes if use cost-effective services AND 
distributional effects are acceptable
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Baseline 
(non-local businesses)
Local businesses, 
non-export base
Local businesses with 
assumed service 
effectiveness of 5-to-1
Fiscal benefits plus exported business costs 35.7 15.8 28.8
Labor market benefits 102.6 (3.4) 61.4
Property value benefits 28.8 (1.1) 16.2
Education cutbacks (38.1) (54.5) (43.9)
Local business effects (6.7) 80.7 322.5
Benefits as % of costs 122.3 37.5 385.1
Benefit-cost ratio 1.223 0.375 3.851
Effects as Percent of Incentive Costs
Conclusion
• Incentive benefits largely earnings, not fiscal.
• “But for” for average incentives probably less than 25%, maybe much less. 
• Pop growth 70% plus of job growth, meaning that need for public services 
increases by sizable % of revenue growth.
• Higher cluster multiplier greatly increases B/C ratio.
• Hiring local non-employed is what matters, not just hiring local.
• Financing incentives via cuts in productive spending makes big difference.
• Local business focus: details matter to whether this works.   
• This model can be adapted to different states, or its concepts can be 
incorporated into other models. 
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